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RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0370
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0955
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0711
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001610

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TAGS: [ET](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [SU](#) [UNSC](#) [KPKO](#)
SUBJECT: UNSC/DARFUR: NEGOTIATIONS STALLED OVER TIMING AND
SUBSTANCE

REF: A. A.USUN NEW YORK 1599

[1](#)B. B.SECSTATE 137766

Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR MOLLY PHEE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
,D)

[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY. Negotiations on the UK-U.S. draft Darfur resolution are at a standstill after the second Experts Meeting August 22. There are disputes over both the timing and content of our draft. Some delegations failed to provide formal comments pending external input. Others, including the P5, maintained their objection to selected elements of the text. Overall, delegations seem content to defer action until the August 28 special Council session with representatives of the GNU and AU. Of note, Russia came to the Experts Meeting prepared to accept the language on date of transition contained in the draft we circulated August 17, but rejected the revised language we presented August 22 per ref B. END SUMMARY.

TIMING

[1](#)2. (C) During expert negotiations August 22, China, Qatar and Congo made a concerted effort to delay Council consideration of the UK-U.S. draft resolution. Qatar reiterated its refusal to engage in any discussion at all until GNU consent is secured. Congo demanded there be no Council action until the AU offered its comments on the draft (expected by August 25). In this regard, the representative of the Congo inaccurately accused the UN of adopting a unilateral approach toward the issue of AMIS transition and failing to work in cooperation with the AU. DPKO representatives tried in vain to explain otherwise.

[1](#)3. (C) China fully supported Congo in its insistence that the Security Council take no action until the African Union pronounced itself on the draft. Congo also reported that AU Commission Chair Konare is preparing to go to Khartoum to talk to President Bashir; then, Konare intends to consult with Congolese President and AU Chair Sassou-Nguesso on next steps regarding Darfur. The representative of Congo pressed for the Council to delay action until those talks conclude. In general, Congo insisted on greater African ownership of the draft resolution process.

[1](#)4. (C) Several delegations, including Russia, Japan, and France, are awaiting input from DPKO before endorsing a final text. Japan and France would not commit to discussion of troop numbers until DPKO reverts early in the week of August

28 with its financial breakdown of the SYG's three options for UNMIS deployment in Darfur. Russia is awaiting DPKO clarification on the need to review the existing SOFA between the UN and the GNU. Qatar alleged that DPKO did not do an adequate job of addressing Qatar's questions about the GNU's submitted plan for stabilizing Darfur and demanded a DPKO briefing. (Note: This request is another stall tactic, as DPKO has already made clear that the GNU plan is inconsistent with the Darfur Peace Agreement). In subsequent Council consultations August 22, Congo asked the Ghanaian Council president to request a formal briefing from the Secretariat on the GNU proposal.

¶5. (C) Overall, delegations seem content to defer action on the draft until the convening of the August 28 special Council session with a GNU official (now expected to be FM Lam Akol instead of VP Taha), AU Commissioner Djinnit and an OIC representative. Note: If the Arab League, which has reversed its initial acceptance and declined the Council's invitation to participate in this meeting, is successful in pressuring the OIC, the AU, and the GNU into declining as well, this meeting may be postponed.

SUBSTANCE

¶6. (C) GNU Consent: Russia and China continue to insist on a mention of the need for GNU consent in OP1. We raised the possibility, per ref B guidance, of 'demanding' that the GNU live up to its governmental responsibilities to protect its citizens by granting its consent for UN deployment in OP1, but Russia was unwilling to be flexible on the wording. Russia agreed with the Chinese proposal to add in PP3, 'bearing in mind that such transition should be approved by the Government of National Unity,' an amendment China had

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first raised in P5 discussions two weeks ago. We are working with Ghana on additional preambular language that would acknowledge past and ongoing efforts to secure GNU consent in order to balance the Chinese and Russian proposals.

¶7. (C) Date of Transition: Per ref B guidance, we circulated a revised text containing our new OP5 formulation. In response, Russia announced it would have been willing to accept the original OP5 language, with the understanding that October 1 did not imply transition start date but rather that UN assistance be provided to AMIS NLT October 1. However, Russia reported that Moscow could not accept our revised language. China repeated its earlier position of opposition to reference of an October 1 transition date. UKUN is opposed to the re-hatting of existing AMIS forces on October 1, but would support the new language proposed by the U.S. if the adjective 'current' is dropped from the reference to the AMIS mandate. France said nothing during the meeting but told UKUN separately that Paris would not support October 1 re-hatting, per ref A.

¶8. (C) Qatar raised the renewed Arab League offer to fully fund AMIS for six months beginning October 1. Note: If we are unable to win Council support for the UK-U.S. draft in a timely manner, and the AL steps in with funding, the AU would have to extend the AMIS mandate beyond September 30, most likely until the UN's target deployment date of January 1, ¶2007.

¶9. (C) Chapter VII: China reiterated its desire to replace in OP12(a) the phrase, 'use all necessary means,' with the UNSCR 1590 language, 'take all necessary action.' Russia supported China's position. France expressed concern that the 1590 formulation would not be adequate to provide for protection of civilians and requested DPKO confirmation. We, the UK, Greece, Japan and Denmark voiced support for the current language.

¶10. (C) Responsibility to Protect: China reiterated its request for deletion of the last phrase of PP2. Russia

reiterated its preference that the reference to paras 138-139 of the Outcome Document be deleted but remained flexible as it had been in previous meetings on this point.

¶11. (C) Danish amendment: Despite our arguments per ref B guidance, Denmark continues to stand firm on its proposal for an additional sub-paragraph in OP8 addressing gender-based discrimination, which would read, 'To ensure adequate human rights and gender presence, capacity and expertise within UNMIS to carry out human rights promotion, civilian protection and gender sensitive monitoring activities.'

BOLTON